Forms and Functions of Legal Discourse Intertextuality in Works of Jewish and Islamic Law and Literature – Quotations, Allusions, References, and Plagiarism

While working on Geonic scripts from around the 10th Century of the Babylonian diaspora, written in Judaeo-Arabic, I have noted a widespread and interesting Medievalist phenomenon whereby authors quote almost exclusively from previous authoritative-canonized sources, mainly from the Babylonian Talmud itself. They do not, on the other hand, quote from their predecessors or contemporaries (non-Jews or even Rabbinates). It also becomes apparent how Talmudic sources are not quoted precisely, but rather mentioned only generally, without specifying the tractate. After examining this phenomenon widely in Jewish and Judaeo-Arabic sources, I realized it is not unique to this literature. Generally, in the Middle Ages, it seems academics worked with different literary conventions than we uphold today. Instead of perceiving the ‘silence’ of the unquoted sources in their works as plagiarism, I suggest we should view the whole normative system of literacy in a different light.
Across periods and cultures, scholarship varies in how it utilizes the richness of available knowledge. The Mediaeval, and especially Judaeo-Arabic oriental, convention followed a simple formula whereby, in Maimonides’ words, “You should listen to the truth, whoever may have said it.” In this famous quote from his introduction to Mishna Avot, known as Shemona Peraqim, Maimonides was referencing non-Jewish literature, in this case, Aristotelian philosophy, which was not recognized as authoritative by his Jewish readers. Maimonides’ words were an attempt to protect himself from being critiqued for referencing unorthodox foreign literature before the general public, as Aristotle’s mindset and alien religious/theological principles were not necessarily acceptable for Maimonides’ target audience.
The rarity of quoting contemporaries and the style of quoting them in the Geonic period and thereafter raise further questions about the practice of allusion, or proof-texting, to support the argument in the text. This stands in conflict with an explicit Baraita Kinyan Torah ordering, which serves to fairly represent a quotation by bearing in mind the original text and attributing the quote to the original author. This duality of approaches represents not only tension or even contradiction between Judaeo-Arabic Mediaeval practice and an authoritative-canonical text, but rather it turns theologically paradoxical. The instruction in the Baraita Kinyan Torah 6:6, following or corresponding with the previous source Midrash Sifri Numbers §157, recommends making explicit references and rejects the opposite practice of refraining from doing so. The justification for this stance is theologically grounded in a later source, the above mentioned Baraita in Kinyan Torah: “the one who quotes brings revelation/deliverance unto the worldliness.”
In my lecture, I hope to elaborate more on the tension between theology and praxis, idealism vs. reality, law vs. Minhag/Idjmaa as a source of valid law, and finally, the written and apparently binding law vs. the Oral Torah. The lecture will further refer to the phenomenon of Genizah, stemming from an overproduction of the textual traditions of the Talmud Torah, with associated difficulty in referring to everything that has been said or written. Through my presentation, I hope to introduce you to the ambiguity of quotes within Judaeo-Arabic Mediaeval writings, and how that can be problematized as plagiarism.